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A RESURGENCE OF THE KLAXON CONTROVERSY CONTEMPORARY LEGAL TRENDS REVITALIZE
AN OLD PRINCIPLE
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1941 landmark decision of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg.
Co.,' the United States Supreme Court concluded that the principle of
Erie KR. v. Tompkins2 extended to the field of conflict of laws. Under
Klaxon, a federal court must apply the conflict or choice of law rule prevailing in the forum state to the extent that Erie dictates that state law
should supply the rule of decision applicable to a case. The Klaxon decision
has evoked extensive debate among legal theorists, and recent developments
in the choice of law area have caused the debate to intensify. A resurgence
of the controversy has also been engendered by the American Law Institute's proposals to extend federal diversity jurisdiction to encompass what
are termed multi-party, multi-state diversity cases.3 These proposals recommend amendment of the Judicial Code to empower district courts to
entertain suits which cannot be maintained at the state level because of
the inability of any state forum to acquire personal jurisdiction over all
parties whose joinder is deemed "necessary ' 4 for a just adjudication of
the controversy. The subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts in
these cases is to be perfected by "minimal" diversity of citizenship, a
diversity between any plaintiff and any defendant.5 Since the inability of
the state courts to adjudicate these cases is due to territorial limitations
upon the effective service of state process, the district courts are to be accorded "worldwide" service of process6 in order to summon all "necessary"
1. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
2. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
3. ALl STUDY O THr DIVISION O JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATX AND FEDERAL
COURTS §§ 2341-46, at 33-43 (Official Draft 1965) [hereinafter referred to as ALL
STUDY].

4. A party is deemed "necessary" as a defendant if complete relief cannot be
accorded the plaintiff in his absence, or if dismissal would be necessitated under federal
or state rules without his joinder. ALl STUDY § 2341(b), at 33. A party is deemed
"necessary" as a plaintiff if he claims an interest in the subject matter of the action
and is so situated that disposition of the action in his absence may leave the defendant
subject to substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent
obligations. ALl STUDY § 2343(b), at 36.
5. ALI STUDY § 2341 (a), at 33. In general diversity litigation, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806), necessitating "complete" diversity of
citizenship between every plaintiff and every defendant, has been followed. According
to the ALL, however, the Strawbridge rule is not compelled by article III of the
Constitution, so that "minimal" diversity is a permissible basis for federal subject
matter jurisdiction. ALI STUDY 180-90. See Haynes v. Felder, 239 F.2d 868, 875-76
(5th Cir. 1957). Approval of this view is not, however, unanimous. See Reed,
Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 55 Micia. L. Rxv. 483, 526-27 (1957).
6. ALI STUDY § 2344(a), at 39. The ALI offers convincing arguments for the
constitutionality of proposals which would empower federal courts to serve process
nationwide. ALI STUDY 191-95. There is, nevertheless, considerable doubt surrounding
this question. See Abraham, Constitutional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach
of Federal Process, 8 VILL. L. R.v. 520 (1963).
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parties to the forum. Venue will lie in the federal district "where a substan'7
tial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred."
The immediate importance of the ALI's proposals to the Klaxon controversy is found in the recommendation that a district court should be
free, in these multi-party, multi-state diversity cases, to make its own determination upon the issue of which state's substantive law is applicable, without being compelled to follow the choice of law rule of the state in which
it is sitting. 8 The recommendation of so revered a body as the ALI that
Klaxon be abrogated in a specific type of diversity case has prompted an
acute re-appraisal of Klaxon's role in the framework of general diversity
jurisdiction.9 In continuance of this trend, this comment will present and
attempt to evaluate current opinion regarding the propriety of the Klaxon
principle as it operates in the area of general diversity jurisdiction. Brief
attention will also be directed to the suggested abandonment of Klaxon in
the type of multi-party, multi-state diversity cases envisioned by the ALI's
proposals.
II.

TRADITIONAL ATTACKS UPON

Klaxon

Criticism of the Klaxon rule as it operates in the area of general
diversity jurisdiction is neither new nor undisputed. One line of attack
has centered around Klaxon's alleged tendency to encourage interstate
forum-shopping whenever a defendant is amenable to service of process in
more than one state. 10 The compulsion on the part of the district court in
each state to follow the local choice of law rule is said to afford a diversity
plaintiff considerable leeway in the selection of an opportune forum, since
it is likely that at least one state will have a rule favorable to his cause.
It is also asserted that the Klaxon rule thwarts an essential aim in conflict
of laws theory by precluding the attainment of a uniformity in choice of
law rules, which will result in the same substantive law being applied to
a given factual situation, regardless of the federal forum chosen.,'
In answer to these critics, defenders of Klaxon assert that there is
little or no convincing evidence that the Klaxon rule appreciably encourages
7. ALI STUDY § 2342(a), at 34.
8. ALI STUDY § 2344(c), at 39.

9. See CAVERS, THE CHOIcE-or-LAw PRocEss 216 (1965) ; Cavers, Memorandum
on Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on the Klaxon Problem, ALI
STUDY O

THE DIVISION OP JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 154

(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963)

[hereinafter referred to as Cavers, The Klaxon Memo-

randum]; Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494

(1965).

10. See HART & WtSCHLER, Tnn FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
635 (1953); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 201-02 (1963); Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 155-56; Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. Rvv. 489, 515 (1954) ; Keeffe, Gilhooley, Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL
L.Q. 494, 519 (1949).
11.

COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES O

THE CONPLICT 01' LAWS 135-36

(1942); Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 154-55; Hart, The Relations Between

State and Federal Law, 54 COLUm. L. Rzv. 489, 513-15 (1954); Keeffe, Gilhooley,
Bailey & Day, Weary Erie, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 494, 519 (1949). Cf. implied criticism
of Klaxon by Justices Jackson, Black and Minton, dissenting in Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514, 520-22 (1953).
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interstate forum-shopping, and that, in any event, abolition of Klaxon
would signal the return of intrastate forum-shopping by non-resident plaintiffs against resident defendants unable to seek removal.' 2 The Erie Court
implicitly condemned intrastate forum-shopping by establishing a policy
favoring uniformity of outcome with respect to decisions of federal and
state courts sitting within the same state. In so doing, the Court necessarily
recognized that interstate forum-shopping is a lesser evil which must be
tolerated as the inevitable safety valve for opportunists. The Klaxon
decision appears to rest squarely upon the uniformity of outcome principle
of Erie.'8 Since the policy fostered by both decisions is the same, it would
appear that any criticism of Klaxon's alleged tendency to encourage interstate forum-shopping is, in reality, an attack upon the recently reaffirmed
policy' 4 of the Erie decision itself. Furthermore, Klaxon defenders insist
that the quest for uniformity in the choice of law principles governing
diversity cases through the implementation of independent federal rules is
of questionable validity when the sacrifice to legitimate state interests in
the choice of law field which would result from this uniformity is considered.' 5 Even if it be conceded that such uniformity is a desirable goal,
the hope that federal courts released from Klaxon will bring about the
sought after consonance is largely chimerical when the unimpressive record
of the federal judiciary under Swift v. Tyson' 6 is also considered. I"
III.

A NEW

APPROACH TO STATE CHOICE

OF LAW THINKING

The most compelling arguments for and against the abrogation of
Klaxon are to be derived from the fact that, in legal commentary and in
the penumbra of more recent state court decisions, a new concept of the
proper role of the state judiciary in the choice of law process has been
emerging. A generalized summary of this development is a prerequisite to
further informed discussion of the Klaxon problem.
The mechanical choice of law rules of the original Restatement of
Conflicts,'8 and the Bealean "vested rights" theory underlying them, have
been largely discredited. 19 Recognized authorities are in the process of
12. See Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 158-59; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and
the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 541, 562 (1958).

13. See

GOODRICH, CONFLICT op LAWS

25 (Scoles ed. 1964); Abraham, supra

note 6, at 526.
14. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
15. See notes 64-68 infra and accompanying text.
16. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
17. See Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 157.

18. E.g., RZSTATEXMNT, CONFLICT O1 LAWS §§ 332, 358, 377, 378 (1934).
19. See Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTUIMP. PROB. 754

(1963), in which it is stated:
Today the Restatement stands renounced by the American Law Institute itself;
no responsible scholar offers to defend it; court after court throws off the shackles
without waiting for full development of a new rationale, increasingly without the
obeisance to the old system that was ritually observed by pioneering rebels.
For additional criticism see Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28
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formulating sensible substitutes, 20 and their theories are finding increasing
judicial acceptance. Most authoritative expositions of the new approach to
choice of law thinking emphasize what may be called a governmental policy
analysis.

21

The basic function of a state court confronted with a choice of

law problem is no longer seen as determining the "proper" law of a case
through the mechanical application of a set of a priori, single-jurisdiction
selecting rules which produce a result consistent with the assumed goal of
national uniformity but inconsistent with any realistic allocation of the
spheres of legislative control among the states. Rather, under the new
approach to choice of law thinking, the court performs a genuine allocation
of spheres of legislative control by analyzing the policies or governmental
purposes underlying the apparently conflicting laws of each state whose
contacts with the transaction or event sued upon are sufficiently substantial
to raise a choice of law problem. The law ultimately employed is the law
of the state having the paramount governmental interest in the application
22
of its internal law to the particular issue presented.
& CONTMP. PROB. 679, 679-81 (1963) ; R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really
Necessary?, 37 TtxAs L. Riv. 657, 667 (1959). For judicial censure of the original
Restatement's lex loci delecti rule see, e.g., Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (N.H.
1966), in which it is stated that "no American court which has felt free to re-examine
the matter thoroughly in the last decade has chosen to retain the old rule."
20. A relatively comprehensive cross-section of the different theories exemplifying what is referred to in the text of this article as the new approach to choice of law
thinking may be gleaned from perusal of the following works: Cavers, THE CHOICEoF-LAW PROCESS (1965); Currie, SELECTED ESSAYS ON Ta
CONFLICT op LAWS
(1963) ; Ehrenzweig, CONFLICT OF LAWS 307-68 (1962) ; Baxter, Choice of Law and
the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rgv. 1 (1963) ; Currie, The Disinterested Third
State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 754 (1963) ; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 267 (1966) ; Reese, Conflict of Laws and
the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 679 (1963); M. Traynor,
Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF.
L. Rzv. 845 (1961) ; R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
Rnv. 657 (1959) ; Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems 21 U. PITT.
L. Rev. 573 (1960). A list of additional articles can be found in Griffith v. United
Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 13 n.1l, 203 A.2d 796, 802 n.11 (1964).
21. At this point, brief attention must be directed to the Restatement of Conflicts
(Second) which has adopted the general criterion that the proper law in both tort and
in contract cases is that of the state having the "most significant relationship" with the
event sued upon. See ISTATgMENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 332, 332(b),
379 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960). The Restatement's "most significant relationship" test
has been criticized by those who fear that it will degenerate in practice to a mere
contact-counting choice of law theory, without incorporation of policy analysis. See
Leflar, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development In Conflict of Laws,
63 COLUm. L. Rzv. 1212, 1247, 1248 (1963); Weintraub, A Method for Solving
Conflict Problems - Torts, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 215, 244 (1963) ; Comment, The Second
Conflicts Restatement of Torts: A Caveat, 51 CALIF. L. Rvv. 762 (1963). See also
criticisms of Restatement (Second) in EHRaNzwnI,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 351-52
(1962) ; Ehrenzweig, The "Most Significant Relationship" in the Conflicts Law of
Torts, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 700 (1963) ; Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 267, 268-69 (1966). It has been suggested,
however, that the most significant relationship test was intended to incorporate governLAW

mental interest or policy analysis. See Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement
Second, 28 LAW & CONT4MP. PROB. 679 (1963). It has also been urged that the
inescapable effect of the new Restatement, where adopted, will be to require courts
to examine choice of law questions in terms of the state policies involved. Cavers,
The Klaxon Memorandum 169-70, 178.
22. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4-22
(1963) ; Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 163.
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When presented with a case involving foreign elements, a court should
immediately look to the governmental policies underlying the local law
relevant to each particular issue presented; it should then determine
whether local contacts with the case are sufficient to give the forum state
any interest in applying the local law embodying the policies discovered.
An identical analysis in terms of policies, contacts and interests should
then be performed with regard to the pertinent law of any other state
involved in the litigation. If each state considered has sufficiently substantial contacts with the facts sued upon,23 but the foregoing policy analysis
clearly reveals that the policies embodied in one state's internal law can
be significantly furthered without frustrating the corresponding governmental interests of the other states involved, the case is regarded as presenting a "false" conflict which requires the application of the interested
state's law. 24 Where policy analysis discovers a "true" conflict in which
the strong, legitimate interest of the forum state in the application of its
law clashes with a correspondingly strong and legitimate interest of another state, Professor Currie would have applied the law of the forum state
as a matter of course,25 while other authorities would call for further refinements in policy analysis to arrive at the state most intimately concerned
with the application of its internal law to the issue at hand. 26 All authorities agree, however, that the new approach to choice of law thinking should
afford the lex fori a respect unknown under the "vested rights" theory.
Under the new approach, the forum state's choice of law rule is but a
delimitation of the policies underlying the appropriate local law, and a
determination of the extent to which those policies are to be given extraterritorial effect by application of local law to a case having foreign elements.27 There is no reason why this delimitation and determination
should not be afforded the utmost respect if it is within constitutionally
28
permissible limits.
23. It should be noted that whenever the term "forum state" is employed in the
article, the reference is to an interested forum state, that is, a forum state which has
sufficient contacts with the facts sued upon to raise a genuine issue, solvable by policy
analysis, as to whether the local law or that of another state should be applied to the

case. Where the forum state is disinterested - without any substantial contacts with
the facts sued upon - no such genuine issue arises and it is apparent without policy
analysis that the local law is not applicable.
24. See Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 163-64; Currie, The Distinterested
Third State, 28 LAW & CONTUMP. PROB. 754, 756 (1963) ; R. Traynor, Is This Conflict
Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. Rev. 657, 667-69 (1959).
25. E.g., CuiuuM, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws,
in StLUCTD ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 177, 183-84 (1963). For an excellent
summary of Professor Currie's position, see M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor
Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. Riv. 845, 846-47 (1961).
26. See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. R"v. 1, 8-9
(1963); Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 163-64; M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws:
Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. Rzv. 845, 852-67

(1961).
27. See Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 156; Randall, The Erie Doctrine and
State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494, 501 (1965).
28. See notes 51-56 infra and accompanying text.
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Exemplary of the new approach to choice of law thinking in Griffith
v. United Air Lines, Inc., 29 a case involving an action brought in Pennsylvania for the wrongful death of a Pennsylvania resident in the crash of an
airliner enroute from Philadelphia to Phoenix, Arizona. The mishap
occurred in Colorado which severely limited recovery in wrongful death
actions; the Pennsylvania statute, on the other hand, imposed no limitations
on the amount recoverable. Rejecting the traditional lex loci delicti principle "in favor of a more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies
and interests underlying the particular issue before the court,"830 the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court proceeded to delimit and balance the policies
behind the competing statutes in light of the relative contacts of each state
with the occurrence sued upon. The policy underlying the Pennsylvania
statute, which was directed at assuring an adequate recovery to local dependents of Pennsylvania decedents, was held clearly to outweigh the
policy behind the Colorado damage limitation, which was found to be either
the protection of Colorado defendants from excessive verdicts or the prevention of speculative damage computations in Colorado courts. A "false" conflict was therefore revealed, and the statute of Pennsylvania, as the state
possessing the paramount governmental interest in the outcome of the
litigation, was applied.
Policy analysis has similarly played an increasingly important role in
many of the more recent state court decisions l expressing dissatisfaction
with the mechanical choice of law rules of the original Restatement, although
with varying degrees of emphasis. The United States Supreme Court has
also voiced approval of this trend by judicial notice.8 2 Indeed, the Court
has for some time employed a policy analysis approach in resolving full
faith and credit and due process cases in dealing with a forum state's duty
to recognize the law of a sister state.8 3 It was against this very background
29. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
30. Id. at 21, 203 A.2d at 805.

31. For a relatively complete study of the earlier cases evidencing the change in
choice of law thinking which is the subject of present discussion, see Cavers, The
Klaxon Memorandum 166-80; R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
T4XAs L. Riv. 657, 669-73 (1959). An exemplary, albeit incomplete, listing of more
recent cases would include: Fabricus v. Horgen, 132 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965) ; Clark
v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205 (N.H. 1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d
439 (1963) ; Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d
796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965); Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262
N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965) (representing an application of Babcock but reaching a contrary
result on similar facts) ; Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963) (the most discussed of all current conflict of laws decisions) ;
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis. 2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965) (containing an analysis
that very closely approaches Professor Currie's "governmental interests" test). Cf.
Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore. 1, 10, 395 P.2d 543, 549 (1964).
32. See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 12 (1962), in which the Court
commented upon the recent "tendency on the part of some States to depart from the
general conflicts rule in order to take into account the interests of the State having
significant contact with the parties to the litigation" and adopted an interpretation of
the Federal Tort Claims Act consistent with the free development of this tendency.
33. CURRin, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, in SXLECUD ESSAYS ON THS CONFLICT O1 LAWS 188, 192-93
(1963) ; GOODRICH, CONFLICT Or LAWS 22 (Scoles ed. 1964); Leflar, Constitutional
Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706, 723 (1963). Supreme
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that Professor Currie adopted his groundbreaking formulation of the policy
analysis approach, which he termed the "governmental interests" theory. 4
IV.

A NEWLY DISCOVERED CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS

FOR Klaxon?

With this schematic analysis of the new approach to state choice of
law thinking in mind, we proceed to the central question of this study: Is
the abolition of Klaxon in general diversity jurisdiction, or iri any specific
class of diversity cases, permissible or desirable? A negative answer would
be apparent if it could be categorically stated that the Klaxon rule is compelled by the Constitution. Most commentators, however, prefer to think
that it is not. Indeed, considerable doubt has been expressed as to whether
the Erie decision is itself constitutionally compelled,85 in spite of Justice

Brandeis' cryptic references to the "unconstitutionality of the course pursued" under Swift v. Tyson."0 In Hanna v. Plumer,37 however, the
Supreme Court again implied that the Erie decision is supported by the
tenth amendment's proscription against federal encroachment of law-making
powers not delegated to the central government. Of utmost significance
is the fact that the Hanna decision reiterates the principle, adumbrated in
Erie,88 that where failure to apply the law of the forum state in a diversity
suit would cause a sufficient variation in the outcome of the litigation as
between a federal court and a state court sitting within the same state,
considerations of equal protection necessitate compliance with the Erie
command. 9 In view of these recent pronouncements, it would appear that
the Erie decision has definite constitutional dimensions.
Court decisions in which governmental interest analysis has played an important role
include: Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1965) ; Carroll v. Lanza, 349
U.S. 408, 412-13 (1955); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66,
72-73 (1954) ; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1943); Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 503 (1939); Alaska
Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547-50 (1935).
34. Leflar, Constitutional Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 706, 723-24 (1963).
35. E.g., Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALP L.J. 265, 278 (1946) ; Currie, Change of Venue and
the Conflict of Laws, 22 U. CRi. L. RAv. 405, 468-69 (1955). See COOK, THX LoGICAL
AND LZGAL BASES O01
THE CONFLICT olt LAWS 136-46 (1942).
36. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938).
37. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). The Court stated that:
We are reminded by the Erie opinion that neither Congress nor the federal
courts can, under the guise of formulating rules of decision for federal courts,
fashion rules which are not supported by a grant of federal authority contained in
Article I or some other section of the Constitution; in such areas state law must
govern because there can be no other law.
Id. at 471-72.
38. 304 U.S. at 74-75.
39. 380 U.S. at 468, 469. Compare Abraham, supra note 6, at 529-30, wherein the
opinion is expressed that the uniformity of outcome principle of Erie finds a constitutional basis in the fact that the classic view which regards the purpose of diversity
jurisdiction as limited to providing an impartial forum for the out of state litigant has
been traditionally enunciated as a constitutional doctrine. Therefore, "if the purpose
of diversity is thus constitutionally limited and the principle of uniformity of outcome
were not faithfully carried out, the federal courts would be performing a function in
diversity cases beyond that authorized by Article III." Id. at 530.
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Nevertheless, it is argued that even if the Erie decision is of constitutional dimensions, the Klaxon principle is compelled neither by the
Constitution ° nor by the Rules of Decision Act 41 reconstrued in Erie.
Quite to the contrary, it is felt that the concept of judicial power includes
the inherent power to prescribe choice of law rules to govern cases falling
within its scope, and that the constitutionally based grant of power to the
federal courts in diversity cases necessarily includes the power to fashion
independent choice of law rules to govern those cases. 42 In addition, it is
urged that the full faith and credit clause is, 43 and was historically intended
to be, 44 an affirmative grant of power to Congress, and inferentially to the
federal courts, to create a uniform body of conflicts principles binding not
only upon the federal courts but upon state courts as well. Yet neither
Congress nor the Supreme Court has chosen to interpret the full faith and
credit clause in the preemptive manner urged.45 Furthermore, the developing shift in the concept of the state judiciary's role in the choice of law
process tends to make far less supportable the view that, although the Erie
decision may be of constitutional dimension, the Klaxon principle is not.
As previously indicated, 46 under the policy analysis approach, a forum
state's choice of law rule is but a delimitation of the policy underlying the
pertinent local law and a determination of the extent to which that policy
is to be given extraterritorial application. So considered, the choice of law
rule tends to function not as some abstraction independent of substantive
law, but as an essential part of the local law in question. This is so because
it is that portion of the local law which defines the geographical range of
its applicability to particular factual situations. Once a choice of law rule
is considered as part and parcel of a substantive law, the assumed gap
between the Erie principle and the Klaxon rule appears to vanish, and the
latter tends to become as constitutionally compelled as the former. 47 Thus,
40. E.g., WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 199 (1963); Cavers, The Klaxon Memoandum 154; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541,
543-46 (1958) ; Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q.
494, 495 (1965). See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REv. 489, 514 (1954).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964). It is urged that the last phrase of the act, "in cases
where they apply," leaves open the question of which state's law is to apply in a
diversity case and, hence, is capable of being fairly interpreted in a way that would
permit the application of independent federal choice of law rules in diversity cases.
Coox, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT or LAWS 199 (1942);
WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 199 (1963) ; Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal
System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 41-42 (1963); Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State
Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494, 495 (1965).
42. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 200 (1963) ; ALI STUDY 198-202; Hill, The Erie
Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 543-45 (1958).
43. E.g., WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 199-200 (1963) ; Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 202. See Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q.
494, 495 (1965).
44. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 39-40
(1963). Compare EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 28-33 (1962).
45. See notes 51-56 infra and accompanying text.
46. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
47. See Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494,
502 (1965). See, in particular, CURRIE, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws:
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it is arguable that where a district court's failure to apply the controlling
substantive law of the forum state in a diversity case would amount to a
denial of equal protection under the Erie doctrine, 48 the same result should
obtain where the failure is to apply that portion of the forum state's substantive law which is termed its choice of law rule. If the uniformity of
49
outcome policy of the Erie decision has equal protection ramifications,
the Klaxon rule, which is founded upon the same policy, 50 could possess
the same constitutional consequences.
The foregoing argument would, of course, be tenable only so long as
the forum state's choice of law rule remains within constitutionally permissible limits. Under present Supreme Court standards, the choice of
local law by a forum state is regarded as violative of full faith and credit
or due process only if blantantly unreasonable. 51 The Court presently
embraces a "states' rights" approach to conflict of laws, which affords the
states substantial freedom in the choice of governing law.52 The present
test is negative rather than positive in content; an outer limit of permissible
state choice of law has been delineated which provides that the forum may
not apply the substantive law of its own or another state to a litigated set
of facts having no discoverable connection with the state.58 Generally,
however, if the state whose law is chosen has some minimally substantial
connection with the occurrence sued upon, some reasonable governmental
54
interest in the application of its law, the forum state's choice will be upheld.
The Court is reluctant to "weigh" the interests of the chosen state against
the corresponding interests of another state once the requisite minimum
connection is found,55 even if it appears that such a balancing process would
A Retraction, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 431, 434-35 (1963),
where it is stated:
The applicability of a statute or common-law rule to a case having foreign
aspects presents a question of construction or interpretation of the same kind as
does the applicability of the same statute or rule to a marginal domestic situation ....
If this is true, it is clear that a federal court should be bound as firmly
to apply the state court's construction of the law in its application to cases having
foreign aspects as it is bound to apply the state court's construction of the law
in its application to marginal domestic situations ...
But cf. ALI STUDY 198-99 n.6.
48. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
49. Ibid.
50. See note 13 supra.
51. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT or LAW 28-33 (1962) ; GOODRICH, C6NFLICT or LAWS
21-23 (Scoles ed. 1964). See generally Leflar, Constitution Limits on Free Choice
of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963).
52. Leflar, ibid.
53. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930) ; Comment, States' Rights in
Conflict of Laws, 19 ARK. L. Rgv. 142, 145 (1965).
54. See CAVERS, THE CHOICE-or-LAw PROCESs 217 (1965); CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, in
SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT or LAWS 188, 271 (1963) ; STUMBERG, PRINCIPLES
OF THE CONFLICT or LAWS 64 (3d ed. 1963) ; Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 541, 547-48 (1958). See generally Leflar, Constitutional
Limits on Free Choice of Law, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 706 (1963).
55. CURRIE, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests
and the Judicial Function, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 188, 237,
271-72 (1963) ; M. Traynor, Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and
Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845, 854 (1961).
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reveal that the latter state's governmental interests are paramount. This
suggests that more than one state may have a connection with an occurrence that is sufficient to bring the application of its law within constitu56
tionally permissible limits.

The point to be gleaned from the foregoing discussion may be summarized as follows: Abolition of Klaxon in general diversity jurisdiction
would result in giving federal courts freedom to override the choice of law
rule of a forum state that favors local law, a choice of law rule that is permissible under present constitutional standards if application of the local
law would serve any reasonable state interest, and a rule which, when
considered as an exercise in policy analysis, merges into the state's substantive law by virtue of its definition of that law's extraterritorial effect.
This grant of freedom might, therefore, present constitutional objections
comparable to those that attend the failure to comply with the Erie principle.
Such an argument is, of course, open to considerable attack. It will suffice,
however, to indicate that the nearly unanimous opinion that the Klaxon
principle fails to be of constitutional dimensions is not beyond criticism.
V.

TiE

DESIRABILITY OF

Klaxon's

RETENTION IN

GENERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

Assuming for present purposes that Klaxon is not constitutionally
compelled, the question arises as to whether that decision should be preserved as embodying a principle conducive to harmonious federal-state
relations. It must be remembered that whatever desirability there may be
in the concept of state autonomy in the choice of law field must be balanced
against the recognized federal interest in maintaining harmonious relations
between the states, a harmony which is potentially capable of disruption
every time one state is given the opportunity to decide the law applicable
to issues touching several states.5 7 The fear continues to exist that a given
state's choice of law rules may essentially be the product of a provincialism
which is revealed in a reluctance to give operative effect to any but the
local law in factual situations which might, upon a fairer reading, be deemed
governable by the law of some other state.58 Moreover, if allocation of
consistent spheres of legislative control among the states is a goal of con56. In Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962), the Court stated:

one state has sufficiently substantial contact with the activity
in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the states
involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the law of one
Where more than

or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity.
In Comment, States' Rights in the Conflict of Laws, 19 ARK. L. Rev. 142 (1965),
the opinion is expressed that the most recent Supreme Court decisions in this area,

when considered along with existing precedent, "show that more than one state may
have sufficient connection with a set of facts to justify application of its law. .. .

57. See Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494,
502 (1965) ; R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TtXAS L. Rev. 657,
675 (1959).
58. See GOODRICH, CONVLICT oit LAWS 23 (Scoles ed. 1964) ; Baxter, Choice of

Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1963); Wolkin Conflict of
Laws in the Federal Courts: The Erie Era, 94 U. PA. L. Rkv. 293, 298-99 (1946).
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flicts doctrine, autonomy in choice of law matters should not remain with
the states, where the choice of the law applicable to a given case may
depend upon the fortuitous circumstance of which state happens to acquire
judicial jurisdiction. 59 Rather, autonomy in diversity cases should be
lodged with federal courts which, as entities disinterested in questions of
conflict of laws, are in a uniquely favorable position to perform the allocation function properly. 0 For these and other reasons, it is asserted that,
although policy analysis may be the correct approach to choice of law
problems, the proper analyst in a diversity case is a federal court freed
from Klaxon.6"
It would appear, however, that the case for abolition of Klaxon in
general diversity jurisdiction remains unestablished after pro-Klaxon factors are considered. To begin with, the importance of provincialism in
state choice of law decisions appears to be overemphasized by the Klaxon
critics. 62 Under the policy analysis approach, there is considerable leeway
for the permissible application of local law by the forum state. The result
is that, in many cases, what the critics characterize as forum state provincialism "may be no less than the assertion of a genuine state interest
in the teeth of a mechanical choice-of-law rule which would frustrate state
policy." 83 The thrust of the pro-Klaxon argument has been incisively
presented by Professor Cavers, who has asserted that, if policy analysis is
to be fostered as the proper approach to choice of law, there are at least
two compelling reasons requiring the retention of Klaxon in diversity
cases. First, if the basic task of the court under the policy analysis approach
is "to identify state policies and to determine the significance for those
policies of their application or non-application in interstate situations, then
the most appropriate forum for the performance of this task is a court of
a state whose policies are in issue." 6 4 It stands to reason that the forum
state's delimitation of the policies underlying its local law, and its determination of the extent to which these policies are to be given extraterritorial effect, are entitled to greater respect than those of a federal court
less familiar with and, indeed, less interested in, effectuating legitimate
local policies. The reasoning is the same as that which, as a matter of
59. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16
60. See, e.g.,

HART

& WXSCHLR,

STAN.

L. Rrv. 1, 33 (1963).

THP FEDERAL COURTS AND

TH4 FEDERAL

SYSTEM 636 (1953); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 202 (1963); Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. Riy. 489, 515 (1954).

61. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1963).
See Randall, The Erie Doctrine and State Conflict of Laws, 17 S.C.L.Q. 494, 502
(1965).
62. To quote Justice Traynor: "It is answer enough to the misanthropes that
the forces against provincialism are strong today and that a judge trained to look
through the partisan wrappings of a conflict will be inclined to look through provincial
wrappings as well." R. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L.
RPv. 657, 675 (1959).
63. Cavers, The Klaxon Memorandum 165.

64. Ibid.
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logic, compels the conclusion that a federal court should follow the forum
state's interpretations of its own statutes in a diversity case. Broadly stated,
it is the principle that one sovereign's pronouncements regarding the
meaning and incidents of its own laws are the product of expertise and
familiarity with local needs and conditions, and, for that reason, are entitled
to the utmost respect in the eyes of a different sovereign faced with applying those laws. 65 If Klaxon were abolished in general diversity jurisdiction,
a federal court would be free to override the policy-oriented choice of law
rule of a forum state. Retention of Klaxon, however, affords maximum
respect to the forum state's choice of law rule, 66 a respect consistent with
67
the "states' rights" approach currently embraced by the Supreme Court,
and also possesses the distinct advantage of avoiding the danger that federal
courts might be compelled to apply overly provincialistic choice of law
rules. It is clear that the moment the forum state's choice of law rule
overreaches constitutionally permissible limits, a federal court will no
68
longer be bound by Klaxon to apply it.

Professor Cavers' second point is that the abolition of Klaxon is
desirable only if it can be certain that federal courts freed from Klaxon
will adopt the policy analysis approach. He asserts, however, that since
a major factor motivating the abolition of Klaxon would be the quest for
certainty and uniformity in choice of law rules, federal courts released
from Klaxon would tend to fulfill such expectations in the only way
possible, by adopting familiar, mechanical choice of law rules which are
analogous to those exemplified in the original Restatement and defended
as productive of uniformity and certainty.6 9 Abolition of Klaxon, therefore, might well smother the policy analysis approach before it has had
a chance to develop.
In view of the arguments presented, it appears that, at least for the
present, the balance is in favor of continued adherence to Klaxon in general
diversity litigation.
65. For similar reasoning, cf. CURRM, Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws:
A Retraction, in SSLXCT4D ESSAYS ON THS CONFLICT OF LAWS 430, 434-35 (1963).
66. It is believed that the views thus far expressed regarding the desirability of
Klaxon's retention in general diversity jurisdiction are in substantial accord with
those presented in Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 Nw. U.L. Rpv.
541, 546-68 (1958). Professor Hill is of the opinion that Klaxon is not constitutionally compelled, but nevertheless feels that where the forum state has substantial
contacts with the controversy, its choice of law rule should be adhered to by a
federal court in a diversity suit, "not for lack of a constitutional power to devise
choice of law rules, but because in such cases the power should be exercised in such
a way as to effectuate rather than frustrate the policies of the forum state." Id. at 546.
67. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
68. It is generally felt that Klaxon ceases to compel a federal court to apply the
forum state's choice of law rule whenever the rule is violative of the full faith and
0.311[2], at 3414 (2d
credit or due process clause. IA Moom, F4DnRAL PRACTiaC
ed. 1953).
69. CAV4RS, TRi
Memorandum 186-88.

CHoIcz-or-LAw

PROCESs 222 (1965);

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol12/iss3/8

Cavers, The Klaxon

12

Danne: A Resurgence of the Klaxon Controversy - Contemporary Legal Trend
SPRING

VI.

1967]

COMMENTS

THE PROPRIETY OF

Klaxon's

MULTI-STATE

ABROGATION IN MULTI-PARTY,

DIVERSITY CASES

Assuming that Klaxon is best retained in the area of general diversity
jurisdiction, the question remains as to whether there is any merit in the
ALI's proposal to release federal courts from continued adherence to
Klaxon in multi-party, multi-state diversity cases. 70 Since it is apparent
from the very nature of the proposal that the Klaxon principle is not as
secure as it is in the area of general diversity jurisdiction, where the federal
court functions as "only another court of the State,"'
the proposal is
admittedly defensible. Chief among the arguments offered to justify the
recommendation is that:
Choice-of-law rules may reflect the desires of a state as to the extraterritorial reach of its substantive policies. There is no good reason
why a state should be able to effectuate its desires in this regard
against an individual who could not be reached by state process and
72
appears in a forum within the state only by force of federal power.
The argument that a federal court, when it summons litigants through
nationwide service of process, should not be bound to apply the choice of
law rule of a forum state which could not have obtained jurisdiction over
the parties is hardly a new weapon in the anti-Klaxon arsenal. Critics
of Griffin v. McCoach,7 3 which extended the Klaxon principle to federal
statutory interpleader suits, have for years urged the same objection, 74
and, at least in the interpleader context, it is a weighty one indeed. The
argument clearly escapes at least one objection based upon the Erie
doctrine, since it can hardly be argued that the application of an independent federal choice of law rule in this situation encourages intrastate
forum-shopping. 75 Moreover, the policy of Erie favoring uniformity of
outcome between federal and state courts sitting within the same state 0
would not seem to compel adherence to Klaxon where the state in which
the federal courthouse is located could not have obtained jurisdiction to
adjudicate the case. Disparity of outcome is hardly possible where one
70. See notes 3-8 supra and accompanying text.
71. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945).
72. ALI STUDY 149-50.
73. 313 U.S. 498 (1941). See Annot., 134 A.L.R. 1468 (1941).
74. HART & WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 636
(1953); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 202 (1963); Boner, Erie v. Tompkins: A Study
in Judicial Precedent,40 TEXAS L. IEv. 509, 522 (1962) ; Freund, Chief Justice Stone
and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARV. L. Rlv. 1210, 1236 n.62 (1946). But see CuRRE,
Change of Venue and the Conflict of Laws: A Retraction, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT or LAWS 431, 433-37 (1963).

75. See
636 (1953).

HART & WESCHLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

76. See notes 38 and 39 supra and accompanying text.
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of the two potentially disparate forums is powerless to entertain the suit.
77
Similarly, the tenth amendment limitations buttressing the Erie doctrine
would appear to be satisfied by the requirement that the district courts
apply some state's substantive law in a multi-party, multi-state diversity
case, and would not seem to necessitate application of any particular state's
choice of law rule. Thus, the Erie doctrine cannot be said to vitiate against
78
independent federal choice of law rules in such cases.
However, it does not follow from the fact that the Erie doctrine fails
to compel adherence to Klaxon in multi-party, multi-state diversity jurisdiction, that abrogation of the Klaxon principle is desirable in all such
cases. The ALI's argument 79 appears to assume that the only claim the
forum state could have to application of its choice of law rule is a multiparty, multi-state diversity case is the fortuitous presence of the federal
courthouse within its borders. In many cases, however, it is probable that
the forum state will have a much greater claim. Since in the vast majority
of multi-party, multi-state diversity cases, venue will lie where "a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ,
the forum state will often have important factual connections with the
transaction sued upon. If these connections would be significant enough
to give the forum state, if it were seized of the case, governmental interests
in the application of the lex fori which are equal, if not superior, to those
of any other state, then departure from the forum state's choice of law
rule favoring the local law would not seem defensible. To the extent that
the ALI's proposals authorize such a departure, they would appear to
exceed the purpose of releasing the district courts from compulsion to
apply the local choice of law rule when the forum state can make no greater
claim thereto than the presence of the federal courthouse within its borders.
It is to be noted that the ALI is not totally unmindful of the fact that independent federal choice of law rules are not necessarily warranted in all
multi-party, multi-state diversity cases."' Nevertheless, this recognition is
77. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
78. Even if Erie were a bar, it has been urged that the doctrine of "affirmative
countervailing circumstances," expressed in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525 (1958), be invoked to free federal courts from any compulsion to apply
Klaxon in cases of this type. Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A Projection,48 IowA
L. Rxv. 248, 269-70 (1963).
79. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
80. ALI STUDY § 2342 (a), at 34.
81. ALI STUDY 150-51:
The reasons which underlie this release [from Klaxon] do not compel a
wholly independent choice-of-law rul as to each issue in every case within this
chapter. Thus, if all parties involved in an issue were in fact served in a single
state, or if they would all have been amenable to the ordinary process of the district court ... it would normally be appropriate for the district court to follow the
choice-of-law rule of the indicated state. Or, even if the parties to an issue were
not all served . . .within a single state, but the choice-of-law rules of all states
having significant contacts with a given issue point to the application of the same
state's substantive rule of decision on that issue, there is no reason why the federal
courts should not then apply the rule of decision of that state - even though a
fully independent federal choice might have produced a different result.
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not effectively embodied in the black letter terminology of proposed section
2344(c).82 It is submitted, therefore, that the proposed section should
incorporate a proviso sufficient to insure that when the district court sits
in a forum state of the type described above, the local choice of law rule
will be applied.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Klaxon controversy will continue to rage for as long as the American system of government fosters healthy debate between federalists and
states' rightists. The propriety of the Klaxon principle must always be
judged, however, not by what one wishes contemporary legal standards to
be, but in light of what they actually are. If current legal thinking as to
the proper role of the court in the choice of law process placed primary
emphasis upon the importance of national uniformity in conflict of laws,
and if present standards regarding the application of full faith and credit
and due process to the choice of law field were considerably more stringent
than they are, it is questionable whether Klaxon could continue to be
rationally defended. Since both of these areas have shown a susceptibility
to change in the past, it is possible that future developments will call for
Klaxon's downfall. For the present, however, the developing trend in
choice of law thinking sacrifices the quest for national uniformity in the
choice of law field to the desirability of affording the states considerable
leeway in the effectuation of legitimate governmental policies, and present
full faith and credit and due process standards present no obstacle. The
abolition of Klaxon in general diversity jurisdiction, resulting in potential
federal court freedom to override the forum state's policy-oriented choice
of law rule, would therefore seem incompatible with contemporary legal
standards. Approval of the ALI's recommendation that Klaxon be abrogated in the proposed multi-party, multi-state diversity jurisdiction must
be qualified by the proviso that, whenever the forum state has such a
substantial connection with the transaction or event sued upon that application of its law would be a proper result of policy analysis, the district court
should apply the local choice of law rule if it favors the lex fori.
William H. Danne, Jr.
82. ALl STUDY § 2344(c), at 39, provides that: "whenever State law supplies
the rule of decision on an issue, the district court may make its own determination as
to which State rule of decision is applicable."
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